- 海银财富通过数十家空壳公司构筑了一个双层嵌套的700亿元资金池。
- 海银财富销售的理财产品大多登记于”伪金交所”,涉嫌非法金融行为。虚构底层资产及原始债务人。
- 海银财富爆雷后推出化债方案对投资者进行二次收割。
海银财富 爆雷
这家位居行业前三的头部第三方财富公司,在2023年12月中旬突然宣布全面停止理财产品的兑付,引发了广泛关注。经过超过2个月的实地调查,证券时报记者发现,海银财富的运作模式存在严重问题。
在销售端,海银财富依靠分布于90余个城市的180多个线下财富中心,聚集了4万余名高净值人群。这些高净值客户主要是通过海银财富的理财师进行投资,起投金额多为30万元或100万元不等,期限从6个月到4年不等,年化收益率在7%-10%之间。从产品名称来看,几乎都是”债权项目”,即资金主要用于放贷,底层资产多为”应收账款”等债权资产。
在募资环节,海银财富采取了一种典型的”资金池”模式。数十个空壳公司以独立第三方的面目出现,投资人的投资款打入这些公司的账户,并构筑出一个双层嵌套结构的庞大资金池。这些空壳公司普遍注册资本高达1亿元以上,但实缴资本仅有1万元或0元。
伪金交所 非法集资
作为募资工具的理财产品,则借道”伪金交所”进行登记备案。记者梳理发现,海银财富所销售的465只理财产品,全部都是在这些”伪金交所”平台上登记的,涉及15家”伪金交所”。早在2021年底,相关监管部门就已经展开了对”伪金交所”的清理整顿,认定其从事的”挂牌、摘牌”以及”登记、备案”业务均属于非法金融行为。
在投资环节,资金所投向的底层资产,与募集说明书宣称的严重不匹配,大部分资金去向不明。记者实地调查发现,底层资产要么完全虚构捏造,无法向底层公司主张权利;要么与底层公司合同、资金已经两清,底层资产也已不存在;要么大规模的超募,底层融资方获得的资金远低于产品募资额,能向底层公司主张的权利非常有限。
比如,记者追踪了海银财富销售的”供应链金融”类产品,发现不同发行人所发行的产品,其底层资产涉及的债权人与债务人呈现出大面积重叠的特征。这些公司看上去各自股权独立,却有着多重的关联与交集,诸如相同的注册地址、相同的联系电话、相同的法定代表人。但当记者前往实地寻访时,这些公司要么”查无此公司”,要么只有一个不足2平方米的”格子间”,无人办公。
除了供应链金融类产品,海银财富还有大量投向地产和政信项目的理财产品。记者通过实地调查发现,这些底层项目要么已经终止,要么完全虚构,与募集说明严重不符。比如,一个位于河北的京东物流基地项目,开发商表示从未在市场上募集过资金;一个位于广州的旧改项目,也在2023年7月前后被终止,开发商下落不明。
海银财富在市场上存续长达18年,如果依靠”借新还旧”的资金池模式滚动,支付给前序投资人的利息、支付给理财师的销售提成等运营费用、底层资产的坏账等,将逐步”抽干”资金池,直到借新还旧的模式无法运转下去。
产品全面停止兑付之后,海银财富实控人韩宏伟向投资人承诺”兜底”,但推出的化债方案被投资人形容是”二次收割”,绝大部分不被接受。据了解,海银财富已组建一支团队,专职催收在外的债权,同时还聘请第三方审计进场,但审计报告至今未见出具。
海银财富的崩盘事件,折射出了当前第三方财富管理行业的深层次问题。首先,监管缺失是导致问题恶化的根源。海银财富长期以来通过”伪金交所”登记备案的非法金融产品,却能大规模吸引资金,暴露了监管部门对此类平台的监管漏洞。同时,对于第三方财富公司的内部运营、资金流向等关键环节,监管也存在盲区,使得一些不法分子有机可乘。
其次,投资者自身的风险意识和金融知识储备也亟待提升。海银财富的高收益率产品,很大程度上利用了投资者的贪婪心理,加之对理财师的过度信任,导致了大量”踩雷”事件。投资者需要提高自身的风险意识,谨慎评估收益与风险,而不是盲目追捧高收益。
最后,行业自律机制也需要进一步健全。第三方财富管理行业作为金融业的重要组成部分,应当建立更加严格的行业标准和自律规则,杜绝类似”海银事件”的发生。只有从监管、投资者和行业自身三个层面共同发力,才能真正遏制此类问题的蔓延。
Haiyin Wealth, a Leading Third-Party Wealth Management Firm, Halts Redemption of Financial Products, Unveiling Deep-Rooted Industry Issues
In mid-December 2023, Haiyin Wealth, a top-three third-party wealth management company, abruptly announced a complete halt to the redemption of its financial products, drawing widespread attention. After more than two months of on-site investigation, reporters from Securities Times uncovered severe issues in Haiyin Wealth’s operational model.
Sales Channel Operations
Haiyin Wealth relies on over 180 offline wealth centers spread across more than 90 cities, amassing over 40,000 high-net-worth individuals. These clients primarily invest through Haiyin Wealth’s financial advisors, with initial investment amounts typically ranging from 300,000 to 1 million yuan, and investment terms spanning from six months to four years. The annualized returns promised range from 7% to 10%. Most of the products are labeled as “debt projects,” indicating that the funds are primarily used for lending, with underlying assets often being “accounts receivable” and other debt assets.
Fundraising Mechanism
Haiyin Wealth employs a typical “fund pool” model for fundraising. Dozens of shell companies appear as independent third parties, receiving investors’ funds into their accounts and forming a complex two-tier nested fund pool. These shell companies generally have registered capital exceeding 100 million yuan, but their paid-in capital is only 10,000 yuan or zero.
The financial products used as fundraising tools are registered and filed through “pseudo financial exchanges.” Reporters found that all 465 financial products sold by Haiyin Wealth were registered on these “pseudo financial exchange” platforms, involving 15 such entities. As early as the end of 2021, relevant regulatory authorities had begun cleaning up these “pseudo financial exchanges,” deeming their “listing, delisting,” and “registration, filing” activities as illegal financial practices.
Investment Discrepancies
The funds’ underlying assets often do not match the claims made in the fundraising prospectus, with most of the funds’ destinations remaining unclear. On-site investigations revealed that the underlying assets were either entirely fabricated, making it impossible to assert rights against the underlying companies, or the contracts and funds with the underlying companies had already been settled, rendering the assets non-existent. In cases of large-scale overfunding, the funds received by the underlying financing parties were far below the fundraising amount, severely limiting the rights that could be asserted against the underlying companies.
For instance, reporters tracked Haiyin Wealth’s “supply chain finance” products and found significant overlap in the creditors and debtors involved in products issued by different issuers. These companies appeared to have independent ownership but were interconnected through shared addresses, phone numbers, and legal representatives. On-site visits revealed that these companies either did not exist or operated from tiny “cubicles” of less than 2 square meters with no staff present.
Real Estate and Government Trust Products
In addition to supply chain finance products, Haiyin Wealth also offered numerous financial products targeting real estate and government trust projects. On-site investigations revealed that these underlying projects were either terminated or entirely fictitious, significantly deviating from the fundraising claims. For example, a JD Logistics base project in Hebei had never raised funds in the market, according to the developer. Another urban renewal project in Guangzhou was terminated around July 2023, with the developer’s whereabouts unknown.
Sustainability and Collapse
Haiyin Wealth has been in the market for 18 years, relying on a “borrow new to repay old” fund pool model. This approach gradually drained the fund pool, covering interest payments to earlier investors, sales commissions to financial advisors, and bad debts from underlying assets, until the model became unsustainable.
Following the complete halt in product redemption, Haiyin Wealth’s actual controller, Han Hongwei, promised to “cover the losses” for investors. However, the proposed debt resolution plan was described by investors as a “second plundering” and was largely rejected. It is reported that Haiyin Wealth has formed a team dedicated to collecting outstanding debts and has hired a third-party auditor, but the audit report has yet to be issued.
Industry Implications
The collapse of Haiyin Wealth highlights deep-seated issues within the current third-party wealth management industry. Firstly, regulatory deficiencies are the root cause of the problem’s escalation. Haiyin Wealth’s long-term use of “pseudo financial exchanges” to register and file illegal financial products, while attracting large-scale funds, exposes regulatory loopholes in overseeing such platforms. Additionally, there are regulatory blind spots in the internal operations and fund flows of third-party wealth companies, allowing unscrupulous individuals to exploit these gaps.
Secondly, investors’ risk awareness and financial literacy need urgent improvement. Haiyin Wealth’s high-yield products largely exploited investors’ greed and excessive trust in financial advisors, leading to numerous “traps.” Investors need to enhance their risk awareness, carefully evaluate returns and risks, and avoid blindly chasing high yields.
Lastly, the industry’s self-regulation mechanisms need further strengthening. As a crucial part of the financial sector, the third-party wealth management industry should establish stricter industry standards and self-regulatory rules to prevent incidents like the “Haiyin incident.” Only through joint efforts from regulators, investors, and the industry itself can such issues be effectively curbed.
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